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1 Introduction
Some years ago, models based on the neoclassical tradition assumed that people
always behaved according to their true preferences. Then came the incentives point
of view, and agents were assumed to cheat and to take any possible advantage as
long as it was profitable.
In this paper we attempt to model situations that lie between complete honesty
and total dishonesty:We assume that agents act strategically but that their behavior
is bound by certain self-imposed rules. “Norms of behavior entail ... self-imposed
standards of conduct, such as honesty and integrity”, North (1989).1 An example
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Bashkar, C. Bevia´, S. Chattopadhayay, G. Charness, M. Maschler, C. Matutes, P. McAfee, I. Ortun˜o-
Ortı´n, A. Rangel, J. Roemer, J. Schummer, T. Sjo¨stro¨m, W. Thomson, the participants in seminars in
Hakone (Japan), Harvard, Queen’s University, Rochester, Studienzentrum at Gergenzee (Switzerland),
two anonymous referees and an associate editor.The usual caveat applies.This research has been partially
supported by grants BEC2002-02194, BEC2001-0535, and GV 01-371. This paper is dedicated to Bob
Aumann, from whom we have learned so much.
1 Many psychologists believe that one’s conscience does not always serve one’s self-interest (see
Prelec and Herrstein 1991). Also, the internalization of rules of decent behavior has been invoked as a
way of explaining violations of the principle of rational choice. See Sen (1983, 1993).
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of this might be a departmental meeting where some painful duty (e.g., service) is
assigned among faculty members: A proposal like ”I am not willing to do anything
for the department” is rarely made. Instead, each agent looks for the best proposal
that she can put on the table without being accused of being “indecent”. Another
example is the following: Suppose that the budget of a university is reduced. The
dean, after hearing the chairmen, makes a decision.2 Anticipating that the dean will
try to average the losses, a chairman might ask for more than she had before the
reduction. But this strategy may not work (and even may harm her cause) because
such a demand would be dismissed on the grounds of not being decent. In other
words, proposals must meet certain public standards in order to be taken seriously.
The impact of these constraints is well explained in the words of a historian: “...
the costs of measurement and enforcement of contracts ... offer ample opportunity
for antisocial behavior; andwithout rules being supplemented by self-imposed stan-
dards of conduct which constrainmaximization at somemargins it is hard to believe
that such complex societies would be viable. But the economic models we employ
have little room for such behavioral complexity. Trust, ethical standards of con-
duct, and moral precepts do influence the cost of contracting and the performance
of economies... A major challenge to the social scientist is to develop political-
economic models that are institutionally rich and can take into account more com-
plex behavior than has been done heretofore”, North (1989).3 Also, Shapin (1994)
explains how in seventeen century England, decency requirements shaped the form
of modern science in its beginnings: “Assessments of the reliability of empirical
narratives.... were.. founded upon.... “natures”, “temperaments” and “dispositions”
of different types of people”, and that “gentleman... faced a pragmatic consideration
that enjoined them to be... reliable truth-tellers” (p. 78).
In this paper we analyze the impact of decency constraints on resource alloca-
tions but we do not address the question of why they are binding. We feel that it
would be unfair to dismiss our approach because it does not provide foundations
for the idea of why decency matters. After all, models of price-taking agents were
used for many years before foundations for this behavior were provided. The same
argument applies to the postulate that agents are rational.4
What are these decency constraints? This is a difficult question because these
constraints can take two forms: On the one hand, there are allocations that are not
decent (i.e., the dictatorial allocation). On the other hand, in a given mechanism,
there are messages that are not decent, like to falsely accuse somebody of cheating
when one is cheating himself. Thus, decency constraints depend on the particular
mechanism that is being used.All we can say, at this stage, is that “decent behavior”
can be defined in a natural way in some instances: Themodel of bankruptcy, O’Neill
2 Other possibilities are that the dean computes directly what she thinks is a fair solution or that
agents submit allocation rules that determine the allocation rule that is used (see Van Damme 1986;
Chun 1989; Anbarci andYi 1992; Herrero 2003).
3 The importance of decency in politics is epitomized by the sentence “Don’t you have any decency?”,
which ended an era of modern American history.
4 At this point it may be useful to remark that, according toAdam Smith, human beings have two kind
of sentiments: “self-interest” and “benevolence”. It may well be that decent behavior is just a reflection
of benevolence.
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(1982), Aumann and Maschler (1985), the non-cooperative model of bargaining
in exchange economies, and the canonical mechanism in Nash Implementation,
Jackson (2001). The aim of this paper is not to make an exhaustive analysis of such
cases, but to show that the combination of the ideas of decency and rationality can
produce analytical results (see Rabin 1993 for a similar attempt).
The bankruptcy and bargaining models have similar structures: Agents make
demands thatmust lie in a certain set in order to be considered as being decent. In the
bankruptcymodel no agent can demandmore that her claim. In the bargainingmodel
no agent can propose an allocation that is not individually rational for the other
agent. Decent proposals are converted into feasible allocations by a compromise
function (bankruptcy) or an outcome function (bargaining). A Decent Dominant
Strategy (DDS) for an agent is a decent proposal that, for any decent proposals
made by other agents, is better for her than any other decent proposal she can make.
A Nash Equilibrium in Decent Strategies (NEDS) is a list of decent proposals such
that no agent can increase her utility through a decent proposal.
In the canonical model of Nash Implementation, a message is a triple = (an
economy, an allocation, an integer) (an economy is a description of the preferences).
We impose the following requirements on the set of decent messages: If all agents
announce (the true economy, an allocation prescribed by the SCC, one), this list of
messages is decent. If all the other agents minus, say, i, send the same message,
it is decent for i to state (the true economy, an allocation, one) if the allocation
decreases the utility of i according to the report made by the others. Finally, if at
least two agents disagree on their reports, and it is possible for another agent to
increase her utility by means of a certain message, there is a decent message in
which she can do so. This message may imply very modest gains in utility terms.
This contrasts with the canonical mechanism, in which agents may get what they
ask for, including the whole bundle of goods available!. Later on we consider a
stronger decency requirement.
The main results of this paper are: In Sect. 2 we show that a solution to the
bankruptcy problem can be implemented in DDS if and only if what any agent
receives is strictly increasing on her claim. This implies that, for the case of three or
more agents, the Proportional or the Random Arrival solutions are implementable
in DDS but that the Constrained EqualAwards, the Constrained Equal Losses or the
Talmud solutions are not. Later on, we also consider what can be implemented by
simplemechanisms.Wefind a stark contrast between the cases of two andmore than
two agents. In Sect. 3 we show that in the bargainingmodel with transferable utility,
the Shapley value (which in this domain coincides with other solutions – Nash,
Raiffa, Kalai-Smorodinsky, etc. –) can be implemented in NEDS. We also show
that, in a large class of environments, including exchange economies with more
than three agents, if certain social goals can be implemented by means of a Nash
Equilibrium (NE), they can be implemented bymeans ofNEDS and, with a stronger
decency requirement, that any selection of the Pareto efficient correspondence is
implementable in NEDS. Since the Shapley value and some selections of the Pareto
efficient correspondence cannot be implemented in NE, our results show that the
consideration of decency constraints enlarges the possibility of implementing social
goals. In Sect. 4 our final comments are presented.
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2 Decent implementation of solutions to the bankruptcy problem
Suppose n agents, each one having claims on a specific amount of money, ci,
i = 1, ..., n. The total amount at hand (E) might not be enough to cover all the
claims. An economy is a pair e = (E, c) ∈ Rn+1++ , where c = (c1, ..., cn). Let E
be the family of economies such that for all e = (E, c) ∈ E, ci ≤ E, 5 for all
i = 1, ..., n. Agents always prefer to receive more money. Thus, in this section,
preferences are fixed. Let C = c1 + · · · + cn.
We shall assume that E is claims-comprehensive,6
If e = (E, c) ∈ E, and e′ = (E, c′), with c′ ≤ c, then e′ ∈ E.
Let us look for reasonable rules for dividing the estate E among the claimants.
These rules will be called solutions. Formally, a solution is a function Φ : E → Rn+
such that for all e = (E, c) ∈ E, Φ(e) ≤ c and Φ1(e)+ · · ·+Φ2(e) = min{C,E}.
This means that if C ≤ E, then Φ(e) = c.
Weassume that no solution can be achieved directly because agents knowclaims
but the planner does not. Thus, the planner asks agents about their claims. Formally:
A strategy (message) for agent i, i = 1, . . . , n, is a pair of real num-
bers mi = (mii,Mi), where mii is what agent i asks for himself, and Mi
is the total amount to be distributed according to i. A strategy profile is a tu-
ple m = (m1, . . . ,mn). Let S = R2n be the set of strategy profiles. We
will use the following notation: for any pair of strategy profiles, m, m˜ ∈ S,
(m˜i,m−i) = (m1, ...,mi−1, m˜i,mi+1, ...,mn) ∈ S.
In this framework, our definition of a decent strategy is that no one asks for
herself more than her claim. Formally:
A strategy profile m = (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ S is decent in economy e = (E, c), if for
all i = 1, . . . , n we have 0 ≤ mii ≤ ci, and Mi = min{E,C}. Let us denote the
set of decent strategies in e by D(e).
As an example, suppose that the dean of a university has to allocate somemoney
to cover teaching whose exact quantity is unknown to her. Suppose that the dean
asks each department to submit its needs for teachers. When the chairman of a
department decides about the number of teachers to be asked, she might restraint
herself from asking too much because if this were the case, her behavior might
be termed “greedy” from her fellow chairmen. And bad reputation has unknown
consequences, from mere gossip to a public inquiry. Similarly, when submitting a
CV in order to get grants, scholarships, etc., people seldom falsify their publication
achievements or their existing computers, machines, etc, when CV and existing
equipment act as a claim. Accordingly, committees in charge of awarding grants
5 This restriction puts some ’natural’ limits on individual claims, making the analysis of different
solutions to the bankruptcy problem easier, avoiding distinctions between game-theoretical and non-
game-theoretical solutions. See Dagan and Volij (1993).
6 Note that claims-comprehensiveness implies that in E we have not only “normal” bankruptcy
problems, but also “feasible” problems for which c1 + c2 ≤ E.
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very rarely inquire about the information provided about the claims and, instead,
trust that the behavior of agents is decent.
We will assume that once the agents have made their proposals, a decision will
be reached. Such a decision can be made by a real person, or it might reflect how
agreements are reached among people living in a community. We formalize this
notion by means of the concept of a compromise function.
A compromise function is a continuous mapping F : S → Rn+ such that for all
e = (E, c) and for all m ∈ D(e), F1(m) + · · · + Fn(m) ≤ min{E,C}.
Let us now model the strategic behavior of the agents.
The Solution Φ is implementable in Decent Dominant Strategies (DDS) if there
exists a compromise function F such that for all e = (E, c) ∈ E, there exists
m∗(e) ∈ D(e) such that:
(i) Φ(e) = F [m∗(e)]
(ii) For all i = 1, ..., n, for all e ∈ E, and for all m ∈ D(e), Fi(m∗i (e),m−i) ≥
Fi(mi,m−i), with strict inequality if m∗ii(e) = mii.
There are two extra requirements in addition to the usual ones in implementa-
tion: The Dominant Strategy must be unique and the compromise function must
be continuous. Let us discuss these points in turn. There are three reasons why we
insist on the inequality in (ii) above being strict if mii = m∗ii(e). First, it gives the
agents real incentives to choose the equilibrium strategy, since any deviations from
it will hurt the welfare of the deviating agent. Second, it guarantees that there are
no other equilibria than the one yielding the required allocation. In particular, it
precludes the existence of Nash Equilibria yielding allocations different from the
one prescribed by Φ. Finally, being regarded as a Nash Equilibrium, it is strict, so
that it passes all known refinements. We also require continuity of the compromise
function because we do not want small changes in the messages to be translated
into large changes in the resulting allocation. We now present our first result:
Proposition 1. Let Φ be a continuous solution such that for all i = 1, .., n, Φi is
strictly increasing on ci. Then, Φ is implementable in decent dominant strategies.
Proof. Weshall limit the definition of our compromise functionF to those strategies
that are decent for some e ∈ E. For all e ∈ E, and for all m ∈ D(e), let us call
c′ = (m11, . . . ,mnn), and E′ = M1 = · · · = Mn. Let em = (E′, c′). By
claims-comprehensiveness, em ∈ E. Then, define F (m) = Φ(em). F is trivially a
compromise function.
Let us now show that such F implements Φ in DDS:
Case 1. C > E. Take m∗(e) = (m∗1(e), ...,m∗n(e)), where m∗ii(e) = ci, and
M∗i (e) = E, for all i = 1, ..., n. By construction, F [m∗(e)] = Φ(em∗(e)) = Φ(e).
Moreover, for allm ∈ D(e),we have thatFi(m) = Φi(em) ≤ Φi(e(m∗i (e),m−i)) =
F (m∗i (e),m−i), with an strict inequality if mii = m∗ii(e) due to Φi be strictly
increasing with respect to ci.
Case 2. C ≤ E. Take m∗(e) = (m∗1(e), ...,m∗n(e)), where m∗ii(e) = ci, and
M∗i (e) = C, for all i = 1, ..., n. Again, em∗(e) = e, and thus, F [m∗(e)] =
Φ(em∗(e)) = Φ(e). Moreover, for all m ∈ D(e), Fi(m) = Φi(em) ≤
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Φi(e(m∗i (e),m−i)) = F (m
∗
i (e),m−i), with a strict inequality if mii = m∗ii(e)
due to Φi being strictly increasing with respect to ci. unionsq
In order to obtain a converse of Proposition 1, we first present the following
lemmata:
Lemma 1. Let Φ be a solution implementable in decent dominant strategies. Then
Φi is weakly increasing on ci, for all i = 1, ..., n.
Proof. Let ci < c′i, e = (E, c), e′ = (E, c′) ∈ E, where c′ = (c′i, c−i). Since Φ
is implementable in DDS, there exist m∗(e) ∈ D(e), m∗(e′) ∈ D(e′) such that
F [m∗(e)] = Φ(e), F [m∗(e′)] = Φ(e′).
Consider the following cases:
Case 1. C > E. Thus, C ′ > E, and Fi[m∗i (e′),m∗−i(e′)] ≥ Fi[m∗i (e),m∗−i(e′)],
because [m∗i (e),m∗−i(e′)] ∈ D(e′).
Now, let j = i. Assume that m∗jj(e) = m∗jj(e′). Thus, we have
Fj [m∗j (e
′),m∗−i(e)] > Fj [m
∗
j (e),m
∗
−i(e)], because m∗(e) ∈ D(e′). Addition-
ally, Fj [m∗j (e),m∗−i(e)] > Fj [m∗j (e′),m∗−i(e)], because [m∗j (e′),m∗−i(e)] ∈
D(e). Contradiction, and consequently, for all j = i, m∗jj(e) = m∗jj(e′). As
a consequence, and since M∗j (e) = M∗j (e′) = E, we have that m∗j (e) =
m∗j (e
′). Thus, we have Φi(e′) = Fi[m∗i (e′),m∗−i(e′)] ≥ Fi[m∗i (e),m∗−i(e′)] =
Fi[m∗i (e),m
∗
−i(e)] = Φi(e
′), with a strict inequality if m∗ii(e′) = m∗ii(e).
Case 2. C ′ ≤ E. Thus, C < E. Because of the implementability hypothesis,
Φi(e) = ci < c′i = Φi(e
′).
Case 3. C ≤ E < C ′. Because of the implementability hypothesis, Φi(e) =
Fi[m∗(e)] = ci. Now, a similar reasoning to that in Case 1 allows us to obtain the
result. unionsq
Lemma 1 is a sort of revelation principle for decent dominant implementation.
Note that it states that whenever Φ is implementable in DDS, for all c−i, E, ci,
it follows that Φi(ci, c−i, E) ≥ Φi(c′i, c−i, E), for all c′i < ci. In other words,
revealing ci is a dominant strategy for agent i in the direct revelation mechanism.
We now show that continuity of the compromise function F implies that Φi is
strictly increasing, that is, in the direct revelation mechanism, revealing ci is the
only dominant strategy for agent i.
Lemma2. LetΦ be a solution implementable inDDS.Then,Φi is strictly increasing
on ci, for all i = 1, ..., n.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists c−i, E, and an interval [ci, ci] such that for
all ci ∈ [ci, ci], Φi(ci, c−i, E) = k, while if c′i > ci, Φi(c′i, c−i, E) > k.
Because of the implementability hypothesis, for all ci ∈ [ci, ci], there exists
m∗ii(ci), m
∗
jj(cj), j = i, such thatΦ(ci, c−i, E) = F [m∗ii(ci),m∗−ii(c−i), E]. Fur-
thermore,Fi[mii,m∗−ii(c−i), E]< Fi[m∗ii(ci),m∗−ii(c−i), E] = φi(ci, c−i, E) =
k, for all mii ≤ ci, mii = m∗ii(ci).
Previous inequality indicates that for all ci ∈ [ci, ci], m∗(ci) = di ≤ ci.
Furthermore, Fi[ci,m∗−ii(c−i), E] < k. Let ε = k − Fi[ci,m∗−ii(c−i), E].
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Since F is continuous, there exists a δ > 0 such that whenever |ci − ci| < δ,
then |Fi[ci,m∗−ii(c−i), E] − Fi[ci,m∗−ii(c−i), E]| < ε/2. Take now c′i > ci such
that c′i − ci < δ. Thus, |Fi[c′i,m∗−ii(c−i), E] − Fi[ci,m∗−ii(c−i), E]| < ε/2.And
this holds for all c′i fulfilling previous conditions.
Now, because of the implementability hypothesis, there exists m∗ii(c′i) ≤
c′i such that Φi(c′i, c−i, E) = Fi[m∗ii(c′i),m∗−ii(c−i), E] > k. But then,
m∗ii(c
′
i) > ci, and thus, Fi[m∗ii(c′i),m∗−ii(c−i), E] − Fi[ci,m∗−ii(c−i), E] >
k − Fi[ci,m∗−ii(c−i), E] = ε, which is a contradiction. unionsq
From Proposition 1 and Lemmas 1 and 2 we obtain the following:
Theorem 1. Let Φ be a continuous solution. Then Φ is implementable in decent
dominant strategies iff Φi is strictly increasing on ci, for all i = 1..., n.
As a consequence of Theorem 1, the proportional (P), or the random arrival
(RA) solutions are implementable inDDS,while the constrained equal awards (A) is
not. The Talmud (T) and the constrained equal-loss (L) solutions are implementable
in DDS in the two person case, but they are not for three or more agents. 7 Note
that, since we do not allow claims to exceed the estate, it happens that, in the two
person case,
Ti(E, c) = Li(E, c) =
1
2
(ci − cj + E)
which are, indeed, strictly increasing on ci.
We now look for mechanisms that are simple, so they can be easily understood
without much explanation. The simplest form that F ( ) can take is that depends on
a single number and that this number is additively separable in the messages of the
agents, i.e.
Fi = min
{
ci,
mii +
∑
j =i αji(Mj − mjj)
n
}
where αij , are given parameters such that 0 ≤ αij ≤ 1, with
∑
j αij = 1. Clearly,
the only DDS is mii = ci. Consider, now, the two agents case. For αji = 1,
i, j = 1, 2 we get that
F =
1
2
[(c1 + E − c2), (c2 + E − c1)] ,
7 For the sake of completeness, we provide the definition of the most prominent solutions to the
bankruptcy problem. See Thomson (1985)
Proportional. Pi(E, c) = λci, where λ is chosen so that
∑
Pi(E, c) = E
Constrained Equal Awards Ai(E, c) = min{ci, λ}, where λ is chosen so that
∑
Ai(E, c) = E
Constrained Equal Losses, Li(E, c) = xi, where ci − xi = max{λ, 0}, and where λ is chosen so
that
∑
Li(E, c) = E
Talmud,Ti(E, c) =
{
Ai(E, c/2) if E ≤ C/2
ci/2 + Li(E − C/2, c) otherwise
Random Arrival, RA, is the expected payoff obtained by all agents when all arrival orders are equally
likely, and in each arrival agents are sequentially satisfied up to the available amount of money.
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and we obtain the so-called standard solution (which, in this case, and because of
the restricted domain chosen, coincides with T, RA and L). The standard solution,
nonetheless, differs from P and A. In this case, thus, the standard solution is im-
plementable in DDS by a particularly simple compromise function, namely, the
average of the proposals made by the agents.8
In the case n > 2, and by calling Λ = (αij)j =i,
ΦΛi (E, c) =
1
n
ci +∑
j =i
αji(E − cj)

We obtain
Fi = min
{
ci, Φ
Λ
i (E, c)
}
Note that all solutions in this family are implementable in DDS, since, for all
i = 1, ..., n, ΦΛi (and thus, Fi) is strictly increasing on ci. Nonetheless, for n > 2,
no solution in this family coincides with any of the solutions mentioned before.
Proposition 2. For n > 2, no solution in the set {RA, T, P , A, L} belongs to the
family ΦΛ.
Proof. First notice that, for n ≥ 3, Ti, Ai, and Li are not strictly increasing on ci.
Let E = 6, c = (6, 5, 2), c′ = (6, 5, 2.5). Then, A(E, c) = T (E, c) =
(2, 2, 2) = A(E, c′) = T (E, c), L(E, c) = (3.5, 2.5, 0) = L(E, c′).
Now, let n = 3, we can parameterize ΦΛ by means of six parameters, αij ,
i = j, i, j = 1, 2, 3, so that
ΦΛ1 (E, c) =
1
3 [c1 + α21(E − c2) + α31(E − c3)]
ΦΛ2 (E, c) =
1
3 [c2 + α12(E − c1) + α32(E − c3)]
ΦΛ3 (E, c) =
1
3 [c3 + α13(E − c1) + α23(E − c2)]
LetE = 6, c = (6, 5, 4). For this example, for all admissible values ofΛ, it happens
that ΦΛi ≤ ci, for all i.
ΦΛ1 (E, c) =
1
3 [6 + α21 + 2α31]
ΦΛ2 (E, c) =
1
3 [5 + 2α32]
ΦΛ3 (E, c) =
1
3 [4 + 2α23]
We obtain that RA(E, c) = (7.5, 2, 4.5), and P (E, c) = (2.4, 2, 1.6) cannot be
obtained for any value of Λ. In both cases, α32 = 1/2, and thus, α31 = 1/2. For
RA(E, c), moreover, α23 > 1; For P (E, c), we have that α23 = .4, and then
α21 = .6, but then 13 [6 + α21 + 2α31] = 2.5333 = 2.4. unionsq
Proposition 2 has two implications: One, positive, that, when n > 2, there
are solutions to the bankruptcy problem that are, both, new and implementable in
8 In the arbitration literature, there is a wide consensus that arbitrators tend to split-the-difference
between the last offers of the parties (see Stevens (1966), or Farber (1981)). This result could be
interpreted by saying that, in the two-agents case, the splitting-the-difference mechanism implements
the standard solution in DDS.
This fact does not generalize to the n≥ 3 agents case, as we see later.
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DDS by the simplest compromise function, namely, a linear one.Another is mainly
negative. Our approach points out that the case n = 2 and the case of n > 2
are, somehow, different, a fact already encountered in other areas of economics,
like mechanism design and dynamics. Unfortunately, current theories do not pay
attention to this fact.
3 A theory of decent implementation
when preferences are unknown to the planner
In this section, we develop a theory of implementation based on the notion that
strategies must be decent. Otherwise, most of the concepts are borrowed from the
theory of implementation.
Let A be the set of feasible allocations (alternatives), assumed to be fixed. An
economy, denoted by e, is a list of preferences defined over allocations. The space
of economies is denoted by E. Preferences of agent i are representable by a utility
function ui : A × E → .
ASocialChoiceCorrespondence (SCC) is amappingφ : E → A.Thismapping
represents the allocations that the planner would like to achieve in each economy in
E. But the wishes of the planner cannot be achieved directly because preferences
are not verifiable. Hence, the need for a decentralized procedure to reach decisions,
i.e., a mechanism.
A Mechanism is a list M =(M1, ...,Mn, g) where g : M → A and M ≡
×ni=1Mi. Let m be an element of M . Sometimes we will write m = (mi,m−i).
Define ui(a, e) = ui(g(m), e) ≡ vi(m, e). The list (v1( , e), ..., vn( , e)) will be
called the game (in normal form) associated to (M, e).
Given a mechanism M and an economy e, let D(M, e) ⊆ M be the set of
decent messages. This set embodies two kinds of restrictions. On the one hand,
we have the allocations that agents think are decent in a particular economy. Let
di(e) ⊆ A be the set of allocations that i thinks are decent in economy e. Thus, if
a /∈ di(e) for some i and g(mˇ) = a, mˇ /∈ D(M, e). On the other hand, certain
messages (i.e., to falsely accuse somebody of cheating, etc.) might be not decent,
even if they yield decent allocations. It is possible to regard these restrictions as
embodying certain cultural aspects of the society in which a mechanism is applied.
Let Di(M, e,m−i) ≡ {mi ∈ Mi/(mi,m−i) ∈ D(M, e)} be the set of decent
messages for i, given m−i.
Avector ofmessages (m∗1, ...,m∗n) ∈ D(M, e) is aNashEquilibrium inDecent
Strategies (NEDS) for the game associated to (M, e) if
vi(m∗i ,m
∗
−i, e) ≥ vi(mi,m∗−i, e),∀mi ∈ Di(M, e,m∗−i), ∀i.
In words, a NEDS is a list of decent messages such that, for every agent, her
message is the best decent message, given the decent messages of the rest of the
agents. Let DNS(M, e) be the set of strategies that are a NEDS for the game
associated with (M, e).
A SCC φ is implementable in NEDS if there is a mechanism M such that
∀e ∈ E, DNS(M, e) = ∅ and g(DNS(M, e)) = φ(e).
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What is the relationship between Nash Implementation and NEDS Implemen-
tation? Recall from the above definition that implementation has two parts: Part 1
is to ”sustain” allocations in φ(e) by means of an equilibrium. Part 2 is that there
cannot be equilibria yielding allocations outside φ(e). It is clear that, in general, if
it is possible to sustain an allocation by means of a Nash Equilibrium (NE), this
allocation is also sustainable as a NEDS. But in Part 2 we have that there might be
NEDS that are not NE.As a result, it is not possible to derive a general result on the
relationship betweenNash Implementation andNEDS Implementation because:A)
There might be some SCC that are implementable in NEDS but not in NE because
some NEDS sustain “desirable” allocations that are non-sustainable as a NE. B) A
SCC might be implementable in NE but not in NEDS, because some NEDS sus-
tain “undesirable” allocations. The first claim is easy to substantiate, because one
example is sufficient. This is our Proposition 3 below. The second claim is more
difficult to prove because we need to check it for any mechanism implementing
a SCC. In fact, we will see, in Propositions 4 and 5 below, that under reasonable
conditions, Nash Implementation implies implementation in NEDS and, thus, the
problem described in point B) above does not arise.
Let us consider the domain of exchange economies with n = 2 and two goods.
The consumption set of any agent is R+ × R. Let ωi  0 be the endowment of
agent i = 1, 2. Let ω1 + ω2 = ω. Let xi be the consumption of agent i, and xri
be the consumption of commodity r = 1, 2 by agent i = 1, 2. The set A reads as
follows:
A = {(x1, x2) ∈ (R+ × R)2 : x1 + x2 ≤ ω}
Let Eqsl be the class of economies with utility functions of the form
ui = vi(x1i ) + x
2
i
where vi( ) is smooth and strictly concave. In Eqsl, all Pareto efficient, scale
invariant, and symmetric solutions to the bargaining problem (e.g., Nash 1950;
Shapley 1953; Raiffa 1953; Kalai-Smorodinsky 1975, etc.) coincide. This solution
(in utility terms) is called the standard solution. Define a SCC N : Eqsl → A
such that for each e ∈ Eqsl, N(e) yields allocations in which utilities are those
prescribed by the standard solution. At this point it may be useful to recall that if a
SCC is implementable in NE it must be Monotonic, as defined below.
Preferences in e′ are amonotonic transformationof preferences in e at allocation
a, denoted by e′ ∈ MT (e, a) if
ui(a, e) ≥ ui(b, e) ⇒ ui(a, e′) ≥ ui(b, e′), i = 1, ...., n
In words, preferences in e′ are a monotonic transformation of preferences in e
at a, if a goes up (or stays constant) in the preference rankings of all agents when
we go from e to e′.
A SCC φ is Monotonic (or Maskin-Monotonic) if
e′ ∈ MT (e, a) ⇒ {a ∈ φ(e) ⇒ a ∈ φ(e′)}.
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Maskin monotonicity says that if a was desired by the planner as an allocation
in e and we consider a new economy e′ in which a goes up in the ranking, a should
also be desired in e′. This property is necessary for Nash Implementation (NI) and,
in addition with No Veto Power (defined below), it is sufficient for NI with more
than two agents (see, e.g., Jackson 2001).
It is clear now that N( ) does not satisfy Maskin Monotonicity and, thus, it is
not NI. However, we will show that this solution is implementable in NEDS by a
DemandMechanism. In this kind ofmechanism (first introduced by Sjo¨stro¨m 1996)
M1 = M2 = A. Let mi = (mii,mij), where mij = (m1ij ,m2ij) is interpreted as
the consumption of agent j suggested by agent i of goods 1 and 2.
We assume that in a demand mechanism, it is decent to ask for something that
does not decrease the utility that the other person can obtain in the absence of an
agreement. Note that it is this proposal, and not the resulting allocation, what is
required to belong to Di(M, e,m−i), i.e., no agent makes a proposal that “pushes
the other agent against the wall”. There are several interpretations of this. On the
one hand, it may reflect the fact that any proposal that is not individually rational
for somebody will not be taken seriously. On the other hand, there is a moral
justification: it embodies the idea that is morally acceptable to seek one’s own
pleasure as long as it does not hurt others. A decent proposal therefore is one that
does not decrease the welfare that others can obtain in the absence of an agreement.
Formally,
A strategy profile m = (mi,mj) ∈ M is decent in economy e = (u1, u2), if for
all i, j = 1, 2, uj(mij) ≥ uj(ωj).
Suppose that D(M, e) ⊆ R4++ (goods are essential). Then, we obtain the
following result:
Proposition 3. Let E ⊆ Esql. Then N can be implemented in NEDS by a demand
mechanism with outcome function F (m1,m2) = m1+m22 .
Proof. First, let us review some well-known facts. Pareto Efficient allocations are
the solution to the following program: i = 1, 2
(Pi1)
{
Max vi(x1i ) + x
2
i ,
s.t. vj(ω1 − x1i ) + ω2 − x2i ≥ u¯j , j = i
Where uj is an arbitrary constant. Because utility functions are strictly increasing,
the restriction is binding. Since goods are essential, the solution is interior as long as
u¯j is larger than or equal to uj(ωj). Because utility functions are strictly concave,
the solution is unique and the first order conditions (FOC) for (Pi1) are necessary
and sufficient. They read as follows (derivatives are denoted by primes)
v′ı´(x
1
i ) = v
′
j(x
1
j )
vj(ω1 − x1i ) + ω2 − x2i = u¯j
xrj = ω
r − xri , r = 1, 2
In particular, if we let u¯j = uj(ωj), we have the following program:
(Pi2)
{
Max vi(x1i ) + x
2
i ,
s.t. vj(ω1 − x1i ) + ω2 − x2i ≥ uj(ωj), i = 1, 2, j = i
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Let (x∗ii, x∗ij) be the unique solution of (Pi2), i, j = 1, 2.As a consequence of quasi-
linearity, the Pareto frontier is linear, and the Standard Solution can be expressed
as follows:
N(e) =
[
x∗11 + x
∗
21
2
,
x∗12 + x
∗
22
2
]
.
Let (m1,m2)be aNEDS.Thus, for givenmj ,mi must solve the following program:
(Pi3)
{
Max vi(
m1ii+m
1
ji
2 ) +
m2ii+m
2
ji
2
s.t. vj(ω1 − m1ii) + m2ij = uj(ωj).
Taking into account that proposals must be feasible, FOC for (Pi3), i = 1, 2 are
the following:
v′1
(
m111+ω
1−m122
2
)
= v′2(ω
1 − m111)
v′2
(
m122+ω
1−m111
2
)
= v′1(ω
1 − m122)
vj
(
ω1 − m1ii
)
+ ω2 − m2ii = uj(ωj), i = j = 1, 2.
We are now prepared for the proof.
i) The allocation N(e) can be sustained as a NEDS. Let m∗i = (x∗ii, x∗ij) for
i, j = 1, 2. These messages clearly yield the desired allocation. Moreover, they are
a NEDS, because they fulfill the FOC of a NEDS and under our assumptions, FOC
are sufficient.
ii) Any NEDS yields N(e). Consider again FOC in a NEDS.
Since vi( )′s are strictly concave, v′i( )′s are invertible. Denoting the inverse of
v′i( ) by v′−1i ( ) and letting y ≡ m111 − m122 the first two equations above can be
written as
v′−12
(
v′1
(
y + ω1
2
))
= ω1 − m111, (3.1)
v′−11
(
v′2
(
ω1 − y
2
))
= ω1 − m122. (3.2)
Subtracting (3.2) from (3.1) above we get
y = v′−11
(
v′2
(
ω1 − y
2
))
− v′−12 (v′1(
ω1 + y
2
)).
v′−1i (v
′
j( )), (i = j = 1, 2) is an increasing function because it is the composition
of two decreasing functions. Thus, the right-hand side of the above equation is
decreasing on y. Since the left-hand side is increasing on y, there is only one value
of y that satisfies this equation.Now from equations (3.1) and (3.2) abovewe obtain
thatm111 andm122 are also unique, and, given that vj(ω1−m1ii)+m2ij = uj(ωj), i =
j = 1, 2, we find that m212 and m221 are also unique. Finally, by feasibility, m121 =
12
ω1 −m122, m112 = ω1 −m111, m211 = ω2 −m212 and m222 = ω2 −m221. Therefore,
the NEDS is unique and, from i) above, it yields the desired allocation. unionsq
Proposition 3 above can be proven for an arbitrary number of goods if the utility
function is additively separable in all goods.9 Unfortunately, relaxing quasilinearity
has the implication that no sub-correspondence of the Pareto correspondence can
be implemented in NEDS by a demandmechanism (see Corcho´n andHerrero 1995,
pp. 27-29 for more on this).
We now present a condition necessary for implementation in NEDS.
Remark 3.1 If φ is implementable in NEDS by means of a mechanism M, then,
the following condition holds:
{e′ ∈ MT (e, a), D(M, e′) ⊆ D(M, e), D(M, e′) ∩ DNS(M, e) = ∅} ⇒
⇒ {a ∈ φ(e) ⇒ a ∈ φ(e′)}.
Proof. Sinceφ is implementable in NEDS, ∃m ∈ D(M, e) such that g(m) ∈ φ(e).
Then, m ∈ D(M, e′). Since a is now more (or equally) preferred by all agents,
m ∈ DNS(M, e) ⇒ m ∈ DNS(M, e′). Since φ is implementable it must be
that g(m) ∈ φ(e′). unionsq
It is clear that ifD(M, e) = M, ∀e ∈ E the above condition reduces toMaskin
Monotonicity, i.e.
e′ ∈ MT (e, a) ⇒ {a ∈ φ(e) ⇒ a ∈ φ(e′)}.
Another case in which the above condition reduces to Maskin Monotonicity is
when decency constraints consist only of the sets di(e)′s, and di(e) = di(e′), for
all i, e, e′. An example of the latter condition in the framework of an exchange
economy is when the set di(e) consists of the allocations in which the consumption
of i is not strictly larger than i’s endowments.Unfortunately, the necessary condition
in the remark above implies that, in order to verify it, we have to know what the
sets D(M, e′) look like.
We now concentrate on the study of sufficient conditions for a SCC to be imple-
mentable in NEDS.We will see that with slight modifications, sufficient conditions
for Nash implementation also become sufficient conditions for implementation in
NEDS. Let a∗i (e) ∈ arg max ui(a, e), a ∈ di(e) be a top allocation for i in the set
of decent allocations.
A SCC φ satisfies Strong No Veto Power (SNVP) if
{a∗i (e) = a∗j (e) for, at least, n − 2 agents} ⇒ a∗i (e) ∈ φ(e).
If di(e) = A ∀i, we have the standard definition of NoVeto Power, except that,
here, we needn−2 agents (and notn−1) to agree on some allocation. In the domain
of exchange economies (assuming strictly increasing preferences) with n > 2, No
Veto Power is vacuously satisfied because a∗i (e) = a∗j (e) for all i, j. In the case
9 Notice that in the case of Proposition 3, the outcome function is continuous and the best reply is
single valued because payoff functions are strictly concave on messages.
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of Strong No Veto Power, the property depends on sets di(e)’s. For instance, in
the domain of exchange economies (assuming strictly increasing preferences) with
n > 3, it is easy to see that if the dimension of the sets di(e)´s equals the dimension
of A, Strong No Veto Power holds vacuously. We think of this property as being
more plausible the larger n is.
As a final piece of notation, let Li(a, e) be the set of allocations that are not
preferred by i to a ∈ A according to the utility function ui( , e), i.e., Li(a, e) is the
lower contour set of i at allocation a.
Themechanism that wewill use (denoted byM) is standard inNash implemen-
tation: A message from i, mi = (ei, ai, ki) ∈ E × A × . The outcome function
is defined by the following three rules:
Rule I: If m is such that mi = mj = (ei, ai, ki),∀ i, j,and ai ∈ φ(e), g(m) = ai.
Rule II: If m is such that mi = mj = (ei, ai, ki), ai ∈ φ(e),∀ i,j, except k,
g(m) = ak if ak ∈ Lk(ai, ei). g(m) = ai otherwise.
Rule III: In any other case, g(m) = aj where kj ≥ ki ∀i and if kj = kh, j < h.
This mechanism has been extensively discussed in the literature, see, e.g. Jack-
son (2001). In this mechanism, we impose the following properties on the set of
decent messages. From now on, let e denote the true economy:
α) Suppose m˜i = (e, a, k) with a ∈ φ(e). Then m˜i ∈ Di(M, e, m˜−i), (to tell the
truth and to announce an allocation prescribed by the SCC at the corresponding
economy, is a decent message if everybody says so).
β) Suppose mi = mj = (ei, ai, ki) ∀i, j, except h. Then if a ∈ Lh(ai, ei)
(e, a, k) ∈ Dh(M, e,m−h) (it is decent for h to ask for any allocation that, ac-
cording to everybody else, decreases her utility).
For the next property we need a new definition: Let
UMi(a, e,m−i) = {mi ∈ Mi/ui(g(mi,m−i), e) > ui(a, e), g(mi,m−i) ∈ di(e)}.
UMi(a, e,m−i) is the set of messages of i that, given the messages of the other
agents, yield a decent allocation preferred by i to a in economy e. Let mˇ−i be such
that there are, at least two agents, say j and h with mj = mh.
γ) UMi(a, e, mˇ−i) = ∅ ⇒ ∃m˜i ∈ Di(a, e, mˇ−i) ∩ UMi(a, e, mˇ−i).
This property says that if, at least, two agents send conflicting reports and i can
improve her payoff by means of some messages, at least one of these messages
is decent. In other words, if there is a conflict -and agent i is neither responsible
for it, nor can it be fixed by her-, i is entitled to a payoff improvement, if she can
get it. The interpretation is that all agents are supposed to send identical messages
and once this norm is broken it is decent for other agents to seek improvements.
Notice that the improvement may be small: For instance in the domain of exchange
economies, it might consist of an infinitesimal increase in the consumption of i of
some commodity.
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Finally, two remarks. One, that the mechanism is independent of decency re-
quirements, so the planner does not have to known the particular decency require-
ments of a society in order to implement a certain SCC. Two, notice that conditions
α − β − γ refer to different parts of the mechanism, and thus, there is no incom-
patibility among them.
Proposition 4. Under conditions α, β and γ, if n > 3, the above mechanism
implements in NEDS any SCC satisfying Monotonicity and Strong No Veto Power.
Proof.
Step 1: If a ∈ φ(e),∃m ∈ DNS(M, e) such that g(m) = a. Let m =
(m1, ...,mn) with mi = (e, a, 1). By α), this is a decent strategy profile. Any
possible deviation can only drive the outcome to Rule II) above and, clearly, no
agent can improve with such a deviation.
Step 2: If m ∈ DNS(M, e), g(m) ∈ φ(e). We have three possible cases:
i) Suppose that m is such that we are in Rule I). If e ∈ MT (e′, a), by Mono-
tonicity, a ∈ φ(e′) ⇒ a ∈ φ(e), and we are done. If e /∈ MT (e′, a),there
is an allocation, say a˜, and an agent, say i, such that ui(a˜, e) > ui(a′, e) and
ui(a˜, e′) < ui(a′, e′). By β), mi = (e, a˜, 1) is a decent message that, by Rule
II), yields a˜, which is a contradiction.
ii) Suppose thatm is such that we are in Rule II). Let a be the resulting allocation.
Let the agent who sends a message different from the others be denoted by i.
Thus mi = (ei, ai, ki) = mj = (ej , aj , kj). If UMh(a, e, mˇ−h) = ∅ some
h = i, j, by γ) there is amessage, saymh ∈ Dh(a, e, mˇ−h)∩UMi(a, e, mˇ−h)
which yields an allocation preferred by h to a, and this is a contradiction.
Suppose now that UMh(a, e, mˇ−h) = ∅ for all h = i, j. But these agents
could have obtained any decent allocation, say ah by sending a message mh =
(eh, ah, kh) with a large enough kh. Thus, it must be that a is a top allocation
in the set of decent allocations for, at least, all agents minus i and j.Again, by
Strong No Veto Power, a ∈ φ(e).
iii) Suppose thatm is such that we are in Rule III) above. By an identical reasoning
as in ii) above, we can show that either g(m) is a top decent allocation for n−2
agents (and thus, g(m) ∈ φ(e)) or m is not a NEDS unionsq
As we remarked before, the sets D(M, e) can be understood as being deter-
mined by culture. Thus, different cultures will produce different sets D(M, e) ’s
and, consequently some SCC could be implemented in NEDS in some societies
but not in others.10 We now provide a different set of axioms defining the sets
D(M, e)’s and we will show that a stronger result than Proposition 4 is obtained.
A message for i, mi = (ei, ki) ∈ E × . The outcome function is defined by
the following two rules:
Rule I: If m is such that ei = ej , ∀ i, j, g(m) = φ(ej).
10 In this case NEDS is not strict since there are several best replys when everybody else announces
the true economy and, moreover, the outcome function is not continuous. The first problem can be fixed
by penalizing the dissident with a small fine. However the problem of implementing in NE a SCC by a
continuous mechanism is still open.
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Rule II: In any other case, g(m) = φ(ej) where kj ≥ ki ∀i, kj = kh,if j < h.
In this mechanism, we have new decency requirements that are similar to α −
β − γ. They are as follows.
α1) Suppose m˜i = (e, k). Then m˜i ∈ Di(M, e, m˜−i), (to tell the truth is a decent
message if everybody says so).
β1) Suppose mi = mj = (ei, ki) ∀i, j, except h. Then if ei = e, (e, k) ∈
Dh(M, e,m−h) (it is decent for h to tell the truth if everybody else is not telling
the truth about the economy).
β2) Supposemi = mj = (e, ki) ∀i, j, except h. Then if eh = e, mh = (eh, kh), /∈
Dh(M, e,m−h) (it is not decent for h not to tell the truth if everybody else is
telling the truth about the economy).
γ1) UMi(a, e, mˇ−i) = ∅ ⇒ ∃m˜i ∈ Di(a, e, mˇ−i) ∩UMi(a, e, mˇ−i) where mˇ−i
is such that there are, at least two agents, say j and h with mj = mh and
UMi(a, e,m−i)
= {mi ∈ Mi/ui(g(mi,m−i), e) > ui(a, e), g(mi,m−i) ∈ φ(e′), e′ ∈ E}.
UMi(a, e,m−i) is now the set of messages from i that, given the messages of the
other agents, yield an allocation that belongs to φ(e′), some e′ ∈ E and which is
preferred by i to a in economy e.
Conditionsα1 and γ1 are adaptations ofα and γ to the newmechanism. Condi-
tions β1−β2 are a stronger than β. β1 recalls the situation in Henryk Ibsen’s play
“An Enemy of the People” in which the unsanitary condition of a village is exposed
by a doctor, in spite of the silence of everybody else. β2 is appropriate when n is
large, because nobody wants to confront a crowd when she has lied and the rest
have not, think of the consequences of cheating in your tax form when everybody
else has been truthful.
Instead of SNVP, we now have the following condition: Let
SLi(e) = {a ∈ A/ ui(a, e) ≥ ui(a′, e), a′ ∈ φ(e′), e′ ∈ E}.
In words, SLi(e) is the set of allocations that maximize i’s utility in economy e
over all the allocations chosen by φ( ) (this is reminiscent of i being a Stackelberg
leader, hence the acronym). Now we have the following definition:
A SCC φ satisfies Very Strong No Veto Power (VSNVP) if
{ai ∈ SLi(e) for, at least, n − 2 agents} ⇒ ai(e) ∈ φ(e).
Once again, this is a condition that is plausible when n is large. It is easy to see
that in exchange economies with n > 2 and with “sufficiently rich” E, VSNVP
is vacuously satisfied. We will also assume that if ui(a, e) = ui(b, e),∀i, a = b,
i.e., if all agents think that allocations a and b are indifferent, these allocations are,
in fact, the same allocation. This assumption forbids indifference curves that are
thick or parallel to each other. It is satisfied in exchange economies with convex
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preferences in which at least one agent has strictly convex preferences. Now we
have the following:
Proposition 5. If n > 3, the above mechanism implements any single-valued
Pareto Efficient SCC satisfying VSNVP in NEDS.
Proof.
Step 1: If a ∈ φ(e),∃m ∈ DNS(M, e) such that g(m) = a. Let m =
(m1, ...,mn) with mi = (e, 1). By α1, this is a decent strategy profile and by
β2 any deviation to Rule II is not decent.
Step 2: If m ∈ DNS(M, e), g(m) ∈ φ(e). We have two possible cases:
i) Suppose thatm is such thatwe are inRule I). Letmi = (e′, k′),∀i. If e′ = e,we
are done. If e′ = e,we have two possibilities: If ui(φ(e), e) = ui(φ(e′), e),∀i,
φ(e) = φ(e′) and we are done. If not, since φ( ) is Pareto Efficient , there is, at
least one agent, say i, for whom ui(φ(e), e) > ui(φ(e′), e). But for this agent,
by β1, it is decent to send a message like mi = (e, ki) with ki > k′ for which
her payoff improves, which is a contradiction.
ii) Suppose that m is such that we are in Rule II). Let a be the resulting al-
location. Let i and j be such that mi = (ei, ki) = mj = (ej , kj). If
UMh(a, e, mˇ−h) = ∅ some h = i, j, by γ) there is a message, say mh ∈
Dh(a, e, mˇ−h)∩UMi(a, e, mˇ−h) which yields an allocation preferred by h to
a, and this is a contradiction. Therefore, it must be that UMh(a, e, mˇ−h) = ∅
for all h = i, j. Thus it must be that a is a top allocation for, at least, all agents
minus i and j in the set SLh(e).Again, by VSNVP, a ∈ φ(e). unionsq
One implication of Propositions 4 and 5 is as follows:Take a space of economies
for which Very Strong No Veto Power, Strong No Veto Power and No Veto Power
hold vacuously (i.e., exchange economieswithn > 3). If a SCCdefined in this space
of economies is NI, it is also implementable in NEDS. Therefore, the consideration
of decency constraints enlarges the set of implementable SCC.
To sum up, then, under reasonable conditions, NI implies implementation in
NEDS but the converse is not true. The latter result is explained by the fact that to
“sustain” an allocation selected by the SCC by means of a NE is always possible
because to tell the truth is always a NE. Thus, if a SCC is not NI it is because
there is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) yielding allocations that do not belong to the
SCC for the corresponding economy. Maskin Monotonicity is used to “kill” these
unwanted allocations. We have provided an example (see Proposition 3) in which
decency constraints -not Maskin-Monotonicity- are used to ”kill” these unwanted
allocations.
4 Final comments
In this paper, we have studied how decency constraints affect resource allocations
in some particular environments. Our results can be understood from a twofold per-
spective. From the bargaining point of view, we study the non-cooperative founda-
tions of two specific cases. Instead of looking for reasonable axioms that a solution
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must satisfy, we look for simple procedures and identify the solutions as (decent)
non-cooperative equilibria. From the implementation point of view, our paper is a
(possibly crude) formalization of the idea that, in addition to resource and incen-
tive compatibility constraints, organizations face fairness constraints: people must
perceive the behavior of others as being fair, or at least decent (see van Damme
1986 for an alternative formalization of this idea). If they do not, they might be-
have in unexpected, outrageous ways: The history of the world abounds with this
sort of behavior – industrial sabotage, etc. –. Experimental evidence that fairness
matters in bargaining also abounds (see, e.g., Roth 1995, pp. 287–288). We have
shown that, in certain cases, decent behavior makes the planner’s job easier. For
instance, the standard solution to bargaining problems cannot be implemented in
Nash Equilibrium, but it can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium in Decent Strate-
gies. Another possibility, not explored in this paper, is that the mechanism must be
perceived as being fair. This would tie the hands of the designer, because some
mechanisms could be objected to on the grounds that the rules of the game are
not fair. From an analytical point of view, the problem would be similar to that
of Chakravorti, Corcho´n and Wilkie, (1994), even though the motivation in this
paper is very different, i.e., the inability of the planner to commit herself to certain
allocations.
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